

Changed by War: The Changing Historiography of Wartime China and New Interpretations of Modern Chinese History

Rana Mitter Director of the University of Oxford China
Centre

In the 1930s, two wars captured the imaginations of western progressives. One of them, the Spanish Civil War, still lives in popular historical memory. The other, the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, known in China as the War of Resistance against Japan (*Kang-ri zhanzheng*), has been much more in the historiographical and cultural shadows since 1945. Only relatively recently has this situation changed. This research note reflects briefly on some of the reasons for those changes, and notes two areas in which rethinking the role of the war against Japan might serve to refocus aspects of the field of modern Chinese history: the relationship of local and national history, and a reassessment of the immediate postwar period (1945-1949). Overall, the note argues that the history of China's wartime experience is becoming historiographically both globalized and normalized: in other words, there are trends similar to those seen in the interpretation of the wartime experience in other belligerent countries. The War of Resistance is expanding its territory on China's mental map, and slowly reemerging on a more global historical map as well.

At the centre of this changing situation is a revised understanding of China's World War II experience, and particularly the role of the Nationalist (Guomindang) Government in that conflict. Although this revision is driven significantly by new scholarship from within China itself, it is now shaping the research agenda in the West on this period too. Since the 1980s, it has become much more common, and far less controversial than in the past, to discuss the record of the Nationalist (Guomindang) Government during the war in relatively positive terms, at the same time as continuing to acknowledge the

戰爭帶來改變：變動中的中國 抗日戰爭史與中國現代史新詮

米德 英國牛津大學中國中心主任

1930年代有兩場戰爭激起了西方進步論者的想像力，其一為西班牙內戰，這場戰爭至今仍存在於普遍的歷史記憶中；另一場則是1937至1945年間的中日戰爭，在中國被稱為抗日戰爭，但這場戰爭卻從1945年以來就一直在史學和文化中處於暗處，較不為人所知曉，直到最近這種情況才慢慢改變。本篇研究紀要將簡短地介紹這種改變發生的一些原因，並指出在史學研究的兩個領域：包括地方史和國家史之間的關係、以及戰後初期歷史（1945-1949）方面，重新思考抗日戰爭所扮演的角色，將有助於我們對中國現代史研究的重新聚焦。整體而言，本文主張中國抗戰史正逐步全球化和常態化，換句話說，這種趨勢也發生在其他交戰國的戰時經驗詮釋上。抗日戰爭在中國的心靈地圖上日顯重要，同時也慢慢地重新出現在世界歷史的版圖上。

上述這種改變的核心是建立在對中國二戰經驗的修正上，特別是國民黨所扮演的角色。雖然這種修正明顯的是來自於中國的新一代學者，但也塑造了西方的相關研究議題。從1980年代開始，這種修正後的史觀變得越來越普遍，爭議性也遠較過去少，這主要體現在以相對正面的態度來討論國民

important role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).¹

This new flood of scholarship is particularly notable because the details of China's wartime role fell into historiographical obscurity very early on after the end of the conflict itself. Each of the major actors who had had a role in the China Theatre was compelled, by the constraints of the Cold War, to downplay the importance of the Chinese role in the wartime era. Within the new People's Republic, under Mao, there was no space to assess the record of the Nationalist government in anything other than purely pejorative terms. In turn, after the Communist victory in 1949, the Western powers saw the events of wartime as part of the story of a defeated Nationalist government that had always been an unsure ally in the first place. More historical work on the period did take place in Japan and Taiwan, but even here, a rather different research agenda, which analysed the rise of the CCP and reasons for the Nationalist defeat, focused attention away from the War against Japan as a topic in its own right.

Changes that began in the late Cold War, and which have accelerated since the 1990s, have created new possibilities for historical investigation. The new historiography stresses that the War of Resistance should be taken seriously as a transformative event for Chinese society and politics more widely, rather than as a mere way-station on the path to CCP dominance in 1949. In that interpretation, it becomes more important to understand the contributions, as well as the flaws, in the Nationalist wartime record. The negatives are well-known and indisputable: the state and party were both hollowed out and corrupted by the years of war, there was mass

黨政府的戰時紀錄，以及繼續肯定中國共產黨在戰時的重要角色。

這股新的研究趨勢之所以特別受到矚目，是因為中國在戰時所扮演的角色，幾乎是戰爭一結束之後，在歷史學界就變得模糊起來。在中國這座舞台上演出的主要演員，因為受到冷戰體系的限制，都被迫淡化中國在戰時的重要性。對中華人民共和國來說，在毛澤東統治下，對於國民黨政府所留下的紀錄除了貶低以外，不可能有其他的選項。而相對的，在1949年共產黨勝利之後，西方列強將中國的戰時經驗視為國民黨政府潰敗的一部分，而國民黨政府在他們心中一直是不確定的盟友。對於這段時間的歷史研究主要是在日本和臺灣進行，但在這兩地也出現了完全不一樣的研究方向，主要在分析共產黨的興起和國民黨政府失敗的原因，反倒都遠離了抗日戰爭這個主題。

整個研究方向的改變大約發生於冷戰末期，1990年代起逐漸加速，並創造出歷史考察的另一種可能性。這種新的研究強調必須將抗日戰爭視為使中國社會和政治走向開放的轉型事件，而非以往所認為的抗日戰爭僅是共產黨政權走向1949年勝利的一個中途站。在這種新史觀下，了解國民黨政府在戰時的貢獻以及缺失就變得越來越重要。國民黨的缺點眾所周知且無法辯駁，在戰爭期間國家和黨都被掏空且腐化，在剝削式的徵稅下，中國的人民和社會都處於窮困狀態。然而這場戰爭也極大的提升了中國的

poverty and social deprivation, along with highly exploitative tax-gathering.² However, the war also raised China's global status immeasurably: the country's undoubted contribution to preventing the Japanese controlling all East Asia meant that it could no longer be treated as the semi-sovereign entity that it had been ever since the Opium Wars. In addition, many of the problems of prewar separatism and warlordism had been forcibly resolved by the war. This was not immediately obvious, because of the starkness of the new splits that emerged during the war itself, particularly during 1944-1945. However, the Japanese occupation had in practice broken up the regional fiefdoms that had led to repeated regional uprisings against the Nationalist Government, and areas such as Sichuan which had only tenuously been connected to the National Government were now more firmly in the fold.

Chinese society in the years of the Cold War was deeply affected by the legacy of its conflict with Japan, in a way comparable with that of the major European Allied powers, whose politics were affected in the postwar period by the experience of having the war take place either on their own territory, or in fear of imminent invasion (something always less likely for the United States). All Western societies, including Britain and France, found their attitudes toward their own wartime history changing in the decades after 1945, as their societies changed also. However, in China it took until the 1980s for significant changes to take place in the historiography of the war, and unlike in France, these changes were first authorized by *official* CCP decisions to allow a shift in interpretation. The effects on both academic and popular history were clear. First, there was a reassessment within China of the role

國際地位，這個國家阻止了日本席捲整個東亞地區，代表著不能再以鴉片戰爭以來一直被認定的半主權實體來看待它。此外，許多戰前存在的問題，像是分離主義或是軍閥割據，都因為戰爭的關係強制解決了。這點看來並不明顯，因為在戰爭期間，特別是在1944到1945年間又默默的產生了新的分裂狀態。然而，日本的占領也確實的打破了原本的地域政治，讓一些原本不停反抗國民黨政府的地區，或像四川這種和國民政府關係較為薄弱的地區，因為戰爭的關係，現在都牢牢地被國民黨政府所掌控。

在冷戰期間，中國社會深深地被抗日戰爭的遺產所影響，與主要的歐洲同盟國相似，戰後政治深受戰爭的影響，尤其是那些領土曾受戰禍或是有被立即入侵危險的國家（當然，美國是不太可能發生這種事的）。所有西方社會，包含英國和法國在內，在戰爭結束後的數十年間，隨著社會變遷，對於自己國家戰時歷史的態度也有所變化。但在中國，一直要到1980年代才對那段時間的歷史解釋做出重大的轉變，且不同於法國的是，中國在這方面的改變首先是由中共中央決策允許而開始的，對學院派歷史或一般通俗歷史的影響顯而易見。首先，國民黨在戰爭期間的表現得到重新評估；此外，中共中央決定向日本積極強調其在華戰爭罪行，這點在1950到1970年代對日關係工作上較少被著墨。後者很明顯造成了越來越多人關注抗戰史。1980年代中期許多抗

of the Nationalists during the war. In addition, decisions were made that it was important to remind Japan more strongly about its record of war crimes in China, something that had not been prominent in Chinese relations with Japan during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s. The clear effect of this was that there was much more public attention to the wartime period in China. New museums of the war were opened in the mid-1980s remembering Japanese war atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking, and also built on key sites of wartime history such as Wanping near Beijing and at Shenyang; movies and other museums gave the Nationalist military a much more prominent role, alongside the CCP; and huge amounts of new scholarship poured forth. The war entered popular culture: young writers, born years after the war itself, started to use it as a discussion point to think about their own identities as young Chinese in the early 21st century.³

For historians, the new interest in the War against Japan, and the opening up of new sources and research projects relating to it has provided a new angle to examine wider issues in modern Chinese history. Below, this note deals briefly with two of those areas: the links between local and national history, and the importance of the period of postwar reconstruction.

Where Local and National Histories Meet: Wartime in Sichuan

In recent years, one of the most productive locations for the new wartime historiography has been the City of Chongqing, which served as temporary Nationalist capital during the war years, along with Sichuan province, which surrounds the city. Sichuan and Chongqing have become a case

戰博物館開幕，提醒人們日本在戰爭中的暴行，像是南京大屠殺。另外在幾個抗戰史上的關鍵地點也成立了博物館，像是北京附近的宛平和瀋陽等地。一些博物館或是電影也開始給予國民黨軍隊與共軍並列的更重要的角色，大量研究也不斷出現。抗日戰爭進入了一般的流行文化當中，戰後多年才出生的年輕作家們，在思考 21 世紀初期作為中國人的認同感時，抗戰也成為一個討論課題。

對歷史學家們來說，這種對抗日戰爭的新興趣，以及新開放史料和相關研究計畫，提供了檢視中國現代史宏觀議題的新視角。再次強調，這篇文章將簡短的提到兩個這種新視角：地方史和國家史間的連結，以及戰後重建期的重要性。

地方史和國家史的相遇：抗戰時期的四川

近年來，這種對於新的抗戰史研究出產最多的地區之一是重慶市，重慶是國民黨政府在抗戰時期的臨時首都，也是四川省的一個城市。重慶和四川提供了一個良好的例子，說明充滿地方色彩的歷史是如何與國家史糾葛在一起的。多年以來，重慶地區的戰時歷史就是最難調查研究的部分，所有的檔案都被封鎖，而這個研究主題也一直被視為不重要的議題。在毛澤東統治的年代，只有常勝的共產黨以及延安經驗才擁有對 1949 年後國家和社會最權威的敘事權，重慶在那時只被視為敵對政權的總部而已。然而，

study of the way that a highly locally inflected history has intertwined powerfully with national history. For many years, it was extremely difficult to investigate the experience of Chongqing in wartime; the archives were closed, and the topic was itself seen as of minor importance. During Mao's years in power, it was the triumphant CCP and their experience in Yan'an which was held up as the most powerful metanarrative for the post-1949 state and society, and Chongqing was seen as merely the headquarters for what was now an enemy regime. However, the growing political importance of the region in the 1990s spurred a greater investment in history. The separation of Chongqing as an autonomous municipality in 1996 has boosted, rather than diminished this tendency, since there are now two powerful regions which have had an interest in raising the profile of local history as well as connecting it to powerful national narratives. In particular, the 1990s saw a significant rise in the amount of publication relating to the wartime era.

The new tide of Sichuan-based wartime history also reflected the changing nature of the historical profession in China, as well as the growth of commercial publication. Much of the historical work that appeared in China the early reform era reflected traditional interests such as diplomatic and social history, with the latter very much concentrated on the CCP and the areas under its control. The research based on Sichuan has taken different directions; for instance, an interest in the cultural history of Chongqing during wartime.⁴ In addition, the war has become embedded much more strongly within the wider narrative of the city's development: one major standard history of the city contains some fourteen chapters on the wartime period (including details on industry,

1990年代後隨著四川地區政治地位的日漸重要，也刺激了對當地歷史研究的進一步投入。1996年重慶由四川省分離並升格為直轄市，非但沒有遏止、反而助長了這種趨勢，重慶與四川這兩個強大地區，對於提高地方史的地位，並將地方史與強大的國家歷史敘述做連結發生高度的興趣。特別是在1990年代，關於抗戰史的出版品數量有著顯著的成長。

這股以四川為中心的新抗戰史研究浪潮也反映在中國歷史專業不斷變化的特質以及商業出版品的成長上。在改革開放初期出現的歷史研究多半仍關注傳統議題，像是外交史或是社會史，之後則是對中國共產黨及其統治區域的研究。但以四川為中心的研究則採取完全不同的方向，例如戰時重慶的文化史。戰爭變成了敘述城市發展史的一部分。在一本重慶市史的主要書籍中，對於該城市的發展史就有14章是屬於抗戰時期的，包含了工業發展、人口變化和文化等細節在內。

當然，這種改變也反映出一個中國政治上的大難關已經被克服了。在很長的一段時間中，四川地區對於抗戰的貢獻是不可被提及，也很少紀念的，原因便在於四川和國民黨政府的密切關係，以及相對來說共產黨在此地區的貢獻遠較西北地區少。許多當代的變遷造就出這種改變，從冷戰時期激烈意識形態對抗的消失到中國西南地區在經濟和政治方面的重要性慢慢增加都是原因之一。

population changes, and culture) as part of a much wider narrative of urban development.⁵

Of course, these changes reflect the overcoming of a significant political difficulty in China: it was for a long period impossible to commemorate, much less celebrate, the wartime contribution of Sichuan to the war effort because of its close relationship to the Nationalist Government, and the relatively minor role of the Communist war effort there (certainly compared to the Northwest). A variety of contemporary changes have affected this: from the fading of the radical ideological conflict of the Cold War era to the growing economic and political importance of the Southwest in contemporary Chinese politics, leading to an upsurge on interest in local identity (not just relating to the war, but to the history of the region as a whole).

Perhaps most central to the changed view of history has been a reassessment of the role of the Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's partial rehabilitation in the mainland is one of the most remarkable political and historiographical turnarounds of recent years. In the PRC, Chiang was a purely demonic figure during most of the Cold War. Even as late as 1988, the daring television series *Heshang* (River Elegy) raised eyebrows when it showed the image of Chiang and his wife Song Meiling, even though they were described in unflattering terms. But the intervening decades saw Chiang's reputation significantly reassessed. Chiang remains criticized for the many failings of his regime, but he is now given more credit for many of the developments of the Nanjing decade (1928-1937), many of which now seem more relevant to reform-era China (for instance, attempts to modernize transport

而這也導致了各地區對於地方認同意識的興趣高漲（不僅是關於抗戰，也包含了對整個地區的歷史）。

也許這整個史觀改變的核心來自於對國民黨領導人蔣介石的重新評價，蔣介石形象的重建是近年來中國大陸地區在政治和史學上最不尋常的轉變之一。對中華人民共和國而言，整個冷戰期間蔣介石的形象都還是純粹的惡魔，即使到了 1988 年，大膽的電視紀錄片《河殤》當中播出了蔣介石和其妻宋美齡的影像時，即使劇中對蔣並不過分誇讚，仍然非常引人側目。但在此後這幾十年中也可以看出蔣的名聲明顯地被重新評價，在蔣的統治時期中許多失敗的地方仍然飽受批評，但南京十年（1928-1937 年）間的一些發展則受到了肯定，當時的許多建設現在被認為和中國的改革時代相關，像是現代化的運輸基礎建設以及收回關稅自主權等等。特別是蔣介石的戰時經歷得到最顯著的修正，蔣介石建立大後方政權體制和堅持抗戰到 1945 年等等成就，在近幾十年中國學界引起了強烈的關注，不僅在中國，英語學界也是如此。

被重新評價的並不只有蔣介石一個人而已，許多戰時國民政府的要人，像是前行政院長及外交部長宋子文也被認為在國民黨能夠堅持抗戰上扮演了關鍵角色，特別是在遊說美國羅斯福政府以確保美國國會繼續提供中國所急需的資金。

就像前述重慶的例子一樣，對蔣介石及

infrastructure or regain tariff autonomy). In particular, it is Chiang's wartime record that has attracted the most significant revisionism. Chiang's achievement in managing to establish a regime in exile, and to sustain resistance all the way until 1945, has in recent decades been given significant attention in Chinese scholarship, as well as informing important revisionist scholarship in English.⁶

It is not just Chiang who has undergone reassessment. Other figures prominent in the wartime government, including former prime minister and foreign minister T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) have also been reassessed as major figures who played an important role in maintaining the resistance of the Nationalist Government, in particular by lobbying figures in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration to ensure that they would keep China supplied with the funds that it so desperately needed.⁷

Again, as with the story of Chongqing, the role of Chiang and his family and associates has been reassessed not just in academic studies but also in public history. Various of Chiang Kaishek's former residences have been restored, including the house at Huangshan, outside Chongqing, to which Chiang retreated at the height of the war. Inside, many of the personal items belonging to Chiang, Song Meiling, and also other members of the Song family, are preserved, illustrated and analysed by a rich set of historical explanations and photographs. The tone is, overall, positive, with much emphasis on Chiang's role in prosecuting Chinese resistance to Japan in the face of great strategic difficulties.⁸

Although the primary drivers for the changes in historical interpretation have been political, they

其家族與協力者的角色重新定位不僅僅發生在學院派的歷史研究上，也在一般的公共歷史上發生。許多蔣介石曾經居住的地方都被重新整修，包括重慶郊外的黃山故居在內，黃山故居是蔣介石在戰爭最激烈的時候所住的地方。另外，許多蔣介石、宋美齡和宋家人的私人物品都被保存下來，並用大量的歷史解釋文字和照片做為解說，其文字的走向大體而言都是正面評價，特別強調蔣介石在艱困的戰略環境之下堅持抵抗日本的功勞。

雖然這些歷史解釋改變的主要推手是政治，但是這對於創造出國家級且更全面性的抗戰史研究頗有助益。幾十年來排除或者是淡化國民黨在抗戰中的角色意味著有許多重要的研究領域都還沒有開發：包括了對國民黨軍隊的重新評價、對國民黨政府在經濟和工業政策上的詳細檢視（相對於在共產黨統治區域所進行的經濟改革的詳細研究而言），以及國民黨統治區域的政治發展。而中國抗戰史的研究上仍然有許多領域還需要更進一步的探討，包含了許多圍繞著汪精衛附日政府的議題、共產黨和其他戰時要角的接觸性質等等。然而，還原國民黨時期中國的經驗來敘述中國的戰時經驗有助於我們創造出在內政及對外關係上都更加有力的戰時中國史論述。總而言之，中國抗戰的歷史逐漸「常態化」。從 1945 年以來，對於第二次世界大戰的歷史解釋在各個被其影響的社會都隨著時間改變了，例如在英

have had the effect of producing a much better-rounded historiography of the wartime period itself at a national level. The exclusion, or at best, caricature, of the Nationalist role in the war for decades in China had meant that many significant questions had been left unexplored: these included a balanced assessment of the Nationalist military; a closer examination of the economic and industrial policy of the Nationalist government (in contrast to the detailed work that had been done on the economic reforms in the CCP base areas); and the development of politics in the Nationalist areas.⁹ There still remain areas of China's wartime history that do need further illumination, including many issues surrounding the collaborationist government of Wang Jingwei, and the nature of Communist contacts with other wartime actors. Nonetheless, the restoration of the experience of Nationalist China to the narrative of China's wartime experience has been instrumental in creating a much more powerful account of China's wartime history on both its domestic and international fronts. Overall, the history of wartime China is becoming "normalized." Since 1945, historiographical interpretations of the war have changed over time in all societies that were most affected by it: for Britain, a greater recognition of the contribution of the Empire in winning the war, or for France, the extent of collaboration under occupation. China is now more able to interpret the war as a complex and often contradictory set of processes between various Chinese actors, rather than a more monocausal narrative in which the war was merely a staging-post for the CCP's ultimate triumph. The revival of strong local interest in the role of Chongqing and Sichuan province have become elements in the changing of the national narrative of the war.

國，越來越多人承認大英帝國在贏得這場戰爭上的貢獻，或是在法國，敵軍占領下的通敵程度等。而現在在中國更傾向於將這場戰爭解釋為各個政治實體間複雜且矛盾的一段進程，而非過去的這場戰爭僅是通往共產黨最終勝利的一個過程的單向性解釋。在國家對這場戰爭論述的改變過程中，像是重慶或是四川省這種地方對於其在戰爭中扮演角色的興趣是很重要的一部分。

對於戰後時期的重新評價

對於嚴肅看待國民黨在抗日戰爭中扮演的角色的這種歷史論述而言，不可避免的將會遇到對戰後這段期間重新評價的問題。在戰後初期，國民黨政府有一小段機會來運用從戰爭中贏來的資本，雖然這個政府在四年之後便潰敗了，但至少所贏得的國際成就在其從大陸撤退後仍有部分遺留，最顯著的就是中國成為聯合國安全理事會的常任理事國。國民黨中國也是非歐洲民族國家致力於反帝國主義的模範，不僅僅是對抗日本，同時也對抗英國的帝國主義（也因此惹怒了邱吉爾），雖然這是個短命的模範。

過去十年來最顯著的一個發展是由歷史學而非政治學的角度來探討中國人民共和國最初的那幾年。不過 1945 到 1949 這幾年間還是相對欠缺研究，這段期間通常被認為是除了血腥內戰外什麼都沒有的幾年。很自然的，內戰仍持續是這段歷史解釋的重心，而且無可避免的會以 1949 年中國共產黨的

Reassessing the Postwar

A historical metanarrative that takes the Nationalist role in the War of Resistance more seriously inevitably forces a reassessment of the postwar period as well. And there was a brief opportunity in the immediate postwar period for the Nationalist government to draw on the capital that it had won during the war. Although the government itself would be gone just four years later, at least some aspects of its international achievements would endure well beyond its life on the mainland, the most obvious being the presence of China as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Nationalist China was also a prominent exemplar, albeit a shortlived one, of a non-European nation-state which had successfully advocated an anti-imperialist message, not only against the Japanese, but also against the British (thereby infuriating Winston Churchill).

One of the most notable developments in the past decade has been the investigation of the early years of the PRC as history, rather than as political science.¹⁰ However, the years 1945-1949 still remain relatively underexamined; they are usually characterized as the years of a bloody civil war, but little else. Naturally, the civil war will continue to dominate interpretations of the period, and it inevitable that the end point must be the CCP victory in 1949. But there is also scope to interpret the period in a different context: that of the global postwar, and of “reconstruction.” The notion of “reconstruction” has become a powerful analytical tool in examining the years 1945-1950 as a global turning point. Also, because the Cold War is now a period that is clearly defined in historiography (c. 1945-1991), it has become more

勝利作結。但仍有一些空間另闢蹊徑，也就是從全球戰後和戰後重建的視角加以詮釋。「重建」的觀念成為檢視 1945 到 1950 年間全球各個轉折點的有力分析工具。另外，由於冷戰時期現在在歷史學上已經有了明確的定義（即 1945 到 1991 年），這段期間也可以用在 45 年後終結的冷戰的起始期來看待。

1945 到 1949 年這段期間，對中國來說並不僅僅是國民黨政府倒台的階段（事實上，就算到了內戰末期，仍有許多國外觀察家認為國民黨政府會獲得最終的勝利），還是中國得以仰仗在協助同盟國對抗法西斯主義和極端的民族主義上所贏得名聲的短暫時期。與中國作為一個真正的主權國家崛起於世上同時發生的是大英帝國的衰敗，不到二十年前，大英帝國還是中國的唯一最大投資國。許多的英國人發現他們對於中國在國際事務上的崛起感到無法接受。然而，現實也讓英國人了解到，不能期待戰後的中國會再度落入 1941 年珍珠港事件之前的帝國主義陷阱中。在這種現實感下，對日抗戰的確塑造了主權中國，儘管瓦解了國民黨的中國。1943 年 1 月 11 日簽訂的條約為轉捩點，條約終止了外國人的治外法權及在上海的租界，並且確立戰後將建立起主權獨立且和各國平等的中國，在鴉片戰爭過後的 101 年，「屈辱的世紀」終於走向終點。而 1945 年對日抗戰的勝利，也代表了蔣介石的國民黨政府可以站上世界舞台和戰時盟

feasible to examine the period's beginning as part of the process that leads to the end point, some 45 years later.

Therefore, the 1945-1949 period in China should also be seen not just as the period of the final decline of the Nationalist Government (and until late in the Civil War, plenty of outside observers assumed that the Nationalists would ultimately win), but rather as the brief existence of a state which was drawing on the real, if flawed prestige it had gained for its contributions to the Allied cause against fascism and ultranationalism. The rise of China's status as a genuinely sovereign power in the world community coincided with the decline of the British empire, which until just a couple of decades before had been the single biggest investor in China. Many in the British establishment found the new rise of China in world affairs difficult to accept.¹¹ However, a sense of realism also propelled the British to understand that a postwar China could not be expected to re-establish the trappings of imperialism which had in some cases continued all the way to Pearl Harbor in late 1941. In that sense, the War against Japan was indeed the making of a sovereign China, even while it was the unmaking of the Nationalist Chinese state. The turning point was the signing of the treaty of 11 January 1943, which ended extraterritoriality, abolished the foreign concessions of Shanghai, and finally established that a postwar China would be sovereign and equal: 101 years after the Opium Wars, the "century of humiliation" had finally come to an end. And in 1945, victory over Japan meant that Chiang's Nationalist government could take up its place on the world stage as an equal of its wartime Allies. Chiang himself took great care to issue public statements that stressed that the Chinese

友平起平坐。蔣尤其專注於公開聲明這場勝利不只是國家的勝利，同時也代表了國際反帝國主義的邁進。

1945年之後，蔣介石的地位畢竟是很獨特的，由於中國參與第二次世界大戰，導致他是唯一一個具全球地位的非白人領導人（尼赫魯和毛澤東也都在稍後贏得同樣的地位，但印度的獨立要到兩年後，而中國共產黨的勝利還要再等四年）。蔣介石也自詡中國是東亞和東南亞地區唯一沒有被日本統治的國家（至少他和他的共產黨盟友統治的地區沒有）。蔣也認為他要求對戰後至少是東亞地區的秩序上有主要發言權是完全有理的，美國也部分支持他的這種觀點。但是英國的領導人並不支持美國的想法，不認為新的主權中國足以撼動其東亞利益。邱吉爾在1944年公開宣稱將中國視為強權之一是一場「純粹的鬧劇」，他本人也用極度無恥且帶有種族主義的語言來稱呼中國、印度及其他非白人國家的人民。蔣介石則頻繁批判英國對印度的態度來回應這種評語。1945年後的和解意味著英國現在必須將中國視為擁有真正的主權、且在聯合國中和英國享有同等地位的國家來對待。此外，英國還必須忍受在1941到1945年間，由於日軍佔領東南亞地區而導致英國勢力衰退的屈辱。

在此種氛圍下，對於中國參與國際新秩序的態度必須要有所更動，但是在戰前就存在的一些模糊地帶依舊存在，英國外交事務

victory was not just a national victory, but rather a step on the path to widespread international anti-imperialism.

After all, in 1945, Chiang's position was unique: he was by then the only nonwhite leader to have global status, in his case earned through Chinese participation in the war. (Nehru would later gain similar status, as would Mao, but Indian independence was still two years away, and the CCP victory, four years off). Chiang could also boast that China (or that part of it under his rule, in alliance with the Communists) was the only part of East and Southeast Asia not to come under the control of the Japanese. Chiang felt himself perfectly justified in claiming a major role in the postwar order, at least in Asia, and the US gave at least some support to that view. British leaders, however, did not share the American conviction that a newly sovereign China should be seen as a powerful actor in its own right in Asia: Churchill had declared in 1944 that the idea that China was a great power was "an absolute farce," and Churchill himself used unashamedly racist language in referring to the Chinese, Indians, and other nonwhite peoples.¹² Chiang, of course, returned the compliment by criticizing the British attitude toward India on frequent occasions. Yet the post-1945 settlement meant that Britain now had to deal with China as a truly sovereign power with equal status in the United Nations. In addition, Britain had suffered the humiliation of its power being visibly lost during the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia in 1941-1945.

In this atmosphere, attitudes toward the Chinese participation in the new international order had to change, yet the ambiguities of the prewar era remained, and there was controversy

部內部對戰後的中國政策也有不同的意見，主管遠東事務的 J. C. Sterndale-Bennett 早在亞洲的戰事結束之前便提出了一份很長的備忘錄，這份備忘錄不是想影響某項政策，而是認為英國在處理中國政策時，必須顧及新興強權美國的角色。Bennett 熱切的強調英國必須保持帝國的角色，並清楚的向美國表示這樣做是無私地想幫忙美國收拾日本投降之後的殘局。然而，只有少數的中國人會認同英國在中國所扮演的帝國角色是真正無私的。對於英國帝國主義的反動，正是中國民族主義發展的中心，不論這種反動是出現在上海的街頭，亦或是在日曆上那一個個的國恥日上。1937 年之前，蔣介石當然希望能夠取得英國的幫助來對抗日本，而在之後蔣介石則是希望能獲得軍事援助，但是在戰爭期間，最著名的卻是英軍指揮官和中國之間的惡劣關係，即使有個別英國的傑出人物像是李約瑟等人對戰爭做出了傑出的貢獻，但英國最多將中國視為有變數的盟友。在那麼短的時間內要將彼此之間的關係由帝國時代的征服者調整為戰時的盟友是一件很難克服的事。

雖然英國首相由邱吉爾換成艾德禮，但從戰爭結束之後的英國外交文書中仍可看出英國對於將中國視為列強一直有強烈的不真實感，這種感覺在關於戰後協商的英國聲明中不停的重複出現。對英國來說，承認中國為羅斯福所提出的「四警察」，即四個具有全球重要性的強國，和承認其他國家不

within the British Foreign Office (FO) about how postwar policy toward China should proceed. Even before the war in Asia had ended, J. C. Sterndale-Bennett, head of the Far Eastern section at the FO, submitted a long memorandum, not to influence a particular policy, but rather to speak out in favour of active British engagement with China in a way that would take account of the newly powerful role of the United States. Sterndale-Bennett was keen to stress that Britain should maintain an imperial role and make it clear to the US that it did so for supposedly unselfish reasons, picking up the pieces after the Japanese surrender.¹³ However, few Chinese would have agreed that the British had been unselfish in their imperial role in China. Reaction to the record of British imperialism, after all, was central to the development of Chinese nationalism, whether it was in Shanghai's streets, or in remembering the many *guochi* (national humiliations) that marked the Chinese Republican calendar.¹⁴ Chiang had, of course, sought British assistance to oppose Japan before 1937 and after in the hope that China would gain military support. However, the wartime period had been marked by poor relations between the British commanders and the Chinese, and while British figures such as Joseph Needham had made significant contributions to the war effort, Britain was seen as a variable ally at best. The distance between being an imperialist conqueror and a wartime ally was simply too great to overcome in such a short time.

Despite the change of prime minister from Churchill to Clement R. Attlee, the British diplomatic documents from the end of the war also show a strong sense that the status of China as a major power was "unreal," and this sense recurred frequently in British statements emerging from the negotiations in the immediate postwar period.

太一樣。即使在 1945 年 7 月於亞洲戰事結束前舉行的波茲坦會議期間，英國外交事務部還是清楚的表示中國的新定位是讓他們感到困擾的問題。在一份 1945 年 7 月 10 日英國代表團的簡報中這樣寫道：

對於將中國納入歐洲和平的細節討論中，英國感到非常值得商榷……中國並非暫定對德國有最高處理權的四強之一……蘇聯政府不太可能同意包容中國成為安理會的常任理事國。建議將中國改為一般會員國，對於對德國的最終處置，中國可以加入討論，但沒有投票權。

現在被遺忘的 1945 到 1946 年這段時間其實是很值得被記得的，因為這段時間代表了中國尋求在國際社會上的定位以及被當作「負責任的強權」的初期階段。當然，國民黨政府的這番努力隨著內戰的敗退而失敗了，但那些與其相關的問題，像是對以歐洲和北美為支配中心的世界秩序的重新調整，不僅僅和現在相關，也支持著對整個戰後歷史的再詮釋。

結論

以全世界的眼光觀之，在中國對於抗戰史的研究越發重要，雖然我們距離事件本身越來越遠，就像經歷過那個時代的人們不可避免的日漸凋零一般。本文討論了兩個相當

For the British, there was a difference between the admission of China into an equal status with other states, and its emergence as a power of global significance in terms of Roosevelt's concept of the "Four Policemen." Even during the Potsdam conference in July 1945, before the war in Asia was over, the Foreign Office made it clear that China's new status was something they found problematic: in a brief for the UK delegation on 10 July 1945, they noted that:

The introduction of China into the detail of European peace making is very questionable... China is not a party to the Four Power assumption of supreme authority over Germany... The Soviet Government are unlikely to agree to her inclusion as a principal party on the Council for all purposes. It was suggested instead that China should be "nominally a member of the Council" she should not have a vote on final decisions about Germany, although she might take part in the discussions.¹⁵

It is worth remembering the now-forgotten days of 1945-1946, because they marked an earlier time when a Chinese state was seeking to find a place in the international community, and to be treated as a "responsible great power." Of course, the Nationalist effort did not succeed because of their defeat in the civil war. But the issues that concerned them, including the revision of a world order in which the European and North American powers were dominant, are not only relevant for the present day, but also underpin a reinterpretation of the whole postwar moment.

具體的例子來說明戰間期的這段歷史是如何開始重新塑造我們對現代中國及國際外交史的認知，但這並非要我們全面顛覆過往的認知，而是建議透過抗戰的新視角來廣泛地開啟新的研究途徑。本文以歐洲的西班牙內戰作為起頭，在某些方面可以拿來和中國的戰爭做比較。即使到了今天，西班牙內戰的遺緒仍活生生地存在於現今西班牙的政治事務當中。中國的對日抗戰也是如此，對於這場七十年前結束的毀滅性戰爭，當代政治變革持續為人們帶來新的解讀。

(翻譯／邱鐘義)

Conclusion

Globally, scholarship on the War of Resistance in China has continued to grow in importance, despite our increasing distance from the events themselves as well as the inevitable disappearance of the generation that survived the war.¹⁶ This note has discussed two very specific examples of how that wartime history is beginning to reshape our understandings of modern Chinese domestic and international history, but these are not meant by any means to provide comprehensive coverage of the sorts of areas that might be considered, but rather to suggest the wide range of areas of interpretation that lie open to new approaches if seen through the lens of the War of Resistance. This piece started with a reference to the Spanish Civil War, in some ways the European counterpart to the war in China. Even today, the legacy of the Spanish Civil War remains a live issue in Spanish politics. So it is too with the War of Resistance: changes in contemporary politics continue to cast new light on the immensely important events of the war that devastated China, and ended nearly 70 years ago.

[Notes]

1. One key general history of the wartime period is Zhang Xianwen, ed., *Kang-Ri zhanzheng shi* (Nanjing: Nanjing Daxue chubanshe, 2001). Key academic titles on wartime have been appearing from the Social Sciences Academic Press (China) (*Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe*), and since 1991, the major academic venue for new scholarship on the topic has been the journal *Kang-Ri zhanzheng yanjiu* (Research on the War of Resistance), published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Important western scholarship in this area includes Hans van de

- Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); and Stephen MacKinnon, Diana Lary, Ezra Vogel, ed., *China at War: Regions of China, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
2. One rigorous, negative assessment is Lloyd Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).
 3. See, for instance, Parks M. Coble, "China's 'New Remembering of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-45,'" *The China Quarterly* 190 (June 2007); Rana Mitter, "Old Ghosts, New Memories: China's changing war history in the era of post-Mao politics", *Journal of Contemporary History* 38:1 (January 2003).
 4. *Chongqing kangzhan wenhuashi* [A cultural history of Chongqing during the War of Resistance] (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2005).
 5. Zhou Yongzhu, ed., *Chongqing tongshi* [Comprehensive history of Chongqing] (Chongqing chubanshe, 2003).
 6. Eg Yang Shubiao, Jing Yang, *Jiang Jieshi zhuan* [Biography of Chiang Kaishek] (Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 1988, new ed., 2008); Yang Tianshi, *Zhaoxun zhenshi de Jiang Jieshi: Jiang Jieshi riji jiedu* [Looking for the real Chiang Kaishek: analysing Chiang Kaishek's diary] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 2008). Professor Cheng Hongmin of Zhejiang University now heads China's first Centre for Research into Chiang Kaishek. The most prominent recent English-language work is Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
 7. See, e.g., Hsiao-ting Lin and Wu Jingping, ed., *T. V. Soong: Important Wartime Correspondences (1940-1942)*; Wu Jingping, ed., *T. V. Soong and Wartime Nationalist China (1937-1945)*; Wu Jingping and Tai-chun Kuo, *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (1940-1943)* (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2009, 2008, 2008).
 8. Personal visit to Chongqing, September 2009.
 9. See, for instance, Zhang Yanping, *Kangzhan shiqi guomin zhengfu jingji dongyuan yanjiu* [Economic mobilization by the Nationalist government during wartime] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2008); Xie Yi, *Guomin zhengfu ziyuan weiyuanhui yanjiu* (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2005).
 10. Notable examples in a still-developing field include Jeremy Brown and Paul Pickowicz, ed., *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) and *The China Quarterly* (December 2006), Special Edition on the History of the PRC.
 11. See Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), ch. 26.
 12. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 421.
 13. British Foreign Office files, F 4171/186/10 (7 July 1945), sec. 31.
 14. William Callahan, *China: The Pessimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch.3.
 15. FO files, U 5399/5399/70 (10 July 1945), sec. 9.
 16. In the west, two examples of initiatives that aim to showcase new approaches to the war are based at Harvard and Oxford Universities. At Harvard, the Joint Study of the Sino-Japanese War, directed by Ezra Vogel, has been running conferences since 2000 (see <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/>). At Oxford, the project on China's War with Japan, directed by Rana Mitter, has been running since 2007 (www.history.ox.ac.uk/china).