

Review of *Taiwan in Japan's Empire-building & Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945**

Leo Douw**

Ts'ai, Caroline Hui-yu, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire-building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering*. London, New York: Routledge, 2009.

Liao Ping-hui and David Der-wei Wang, eds., *Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule 1895-1945, History, Culture, Memory*, New York: Columbia University Press 2006.

The revision of the Taiwanese historiography on the Japanese colonial period has begun during the 1970s and continues until today. The books under review are testimony to that process and a result of it, also a very fortunate result. Relatively little academic work on Taiwanese history has appeared in Western languages, and especially the period of Japanese colonialism (1895-1945) has received little attention in the West. This is because Taiwanese history can easily be conceived as being marginal compared to the history of China and East Asia and also to colonial studies (Liao and Wang, introduction, p. 1): not many in the West would follow the logic shared by many Taiwanese that Taiwan was colonized by the Kuomintang

* 本文承蒙一位匿名審查人提供寶貴意見，特此致謝。

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after 1945 and that in this way Taiwan remained a colony for decades after the Japanese had surrendered. To the contrary, even China takes a somewhat hybrid position as a colony since it was never occupied by one single colonizer and always retained its own governments, and also took a very strong independent stand after extraterritoriality had been basically wiped out during the 1930s. This independent stand was represented by the Kuomintang government in Taipei as much as by the CCP government in Beijing after the war, so that Taiwan's colonial past under the Japanese occupation could be represented as an intermediate stage between the basically continuous periods when Chinese governments rightfully claimed sovereignty over it, before and after the fifty years of the Japanese occupation.

National history

The resulting historiography was thoroughly “national”, and deeply connected to the Cold War (1948-1989). China's national struggle against colonial dominance was central to it, as were the ideals of modernization which went together with the anti-colonial struggle and the efforts at state-building which followed decolonization. Modernization was represented as a process through which each individual state should go before it could claim its place among the international community of modern nation-states. The Cold War divide made that Weberian notions of modernization came to dominate in the US-led “free world”, whereas the countries under Communist rule adhered to socialist stages theories, often inspired by Stalinism. Both varieties shared a belief in the possibility of progress towards a Western-type modernity, or capitalism to be replaced by socialism in due time, and shaped their histories accordingly. The modern nation-state as created by European states during the nineteenth century became the universal model for new states in their state-building during the twentieth century. The histories of countries elsewhere were written from a mirror perspective, new states comparing themselves with Western ones, with the focal question as a starting point what each

individual country had missed in its past in order to achieve modernity, and consequently how it should change its society, politics and economy in order to conform to the supposedly universal and automatically to be envied European, or Western ideal model. Of course there were always more sanguine perspectives, particularly among traditionalists, who envisaged to reach a modernity based on the values and institutions of their own societies, but even of these one might say that they did not escape from the conceptual dichotomies and binaries which derived from thinking in terms of modernization, such as tradition and modernity, or feudalism and capitalism. At the same time the colonialism by the Western powers and Japan were visualized as impediments to the modern development of the societies under their rule, and were national histories constructed, which delineated the paths along which individual countries had grown as modern states and had been blocked in their natural development by colonialist or imperialist aggression. These accounts were used as legitimization for the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles waged by the socialist and nationalist movements in the non-Western world. In East Asia, being Chinese was contrasted to being Japanese, and the formation of Japan as a modern nation was conceived as being fundamentally different from the formation of China as a modern nation.

Taiwanese historiography during the 1950s and 1960s was no exception to this rule, and it persists in some measure until today. This is repeatedly stated in the books under review: they are explicit on posing an alternative to these accounts. Taiwan's history in the early twentieth century was conceived basically in terms of its colonial dominance by the Japanese, which was resisted by those who struggled to build a strong and modern Chinese nation against the pressures and burdens imposed by the Japanese colonialists. Since the 1970s however a new awareness came to this, which is also present among present-day historians in Taiwan. Until then, China had been the main concern of Taiwanese historians, and Taiwanese history had been a "local" variety of national history. During the 1970s however by the emerging international recognition of the People's Republic of China as the

official representative of the Chinese nation the question came up how to conceive of Taiwan as a separate state to which different claims were laid by China and by various groups in Taiwan. Caroline Ts'ai in her book relates how this was picked up famously in the West by a small number of high quality volumes, which wrote the history of colonial Taiwan from this angle, but still conceptualized it in terms of its economic and political modernization. These are the works by Patricia Tsurumi, Ramon Myers, Peter Duus and Mark Peattie, which appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They focused on the Japanese colonial empire as a whole and from this perspective paid some attention to Taiwan as a Japanese colony too.¹

Post-colonialism in Taiwan

A new edge was added to this spectrum when in Taiwan the movement for independence came up during the late 1980s and the Kuomintang government could gradually be recognized as an occupant of the island rather than as its legitimate ruler, and as a follow-up regime to the Japanese colonization of the early twentieth century. The imagery on Taiwan as a part of the Chinese nation and a result of China's national development could cautiously be challenged by an image which emphasized the continuities between both "colonial" periods, and visualize in more neutral, if not positive terms how the Japanese colonial regime had laid the basis for Taiwan's modernization. In this perspective, oppression and discrimination of the colonized Taiwanese had occurred all the same in order to achieve progress, but instead of rejecting colonialism right away for these reasons, the question came up how exactly the Japanese had contrived to do this and get at

¹ Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 1996); Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press); E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

least part of the Taiwanese population behind its policy goals. This opened the road towards a more cosmopolitan, or “global” approach of Taiwanese history, as contrary to the previous “national” perspectives. In these newer approaches the emphasis is less on formal political structures and ideologies, and also less on the evaluation of how modernization had affected Taiwan during the twentieth century; rather they seek to find out how Taiwan was connected to its Japanese colonizer and interacted with it, but also with its ever present progenitor China, politically distant yet culturally and geographically close by.

In this new historiography post-colonialism and post-modernism play a large role. Post-colonialism is directed towards creating a place of respect for the formerly colonized nations among the global family of nations. One might say that this also happens in the case of Taiwan, yet here it works the other way around at least as strongly, and probably more so, than in most post-colonial theorizing: Japan tends to be restored as a neutral, or maybe even benevolent colonizer, and contrasted to the felt rudeness and oppressiveness of the Kuomintang regime which followed it up. This may have made that post-colonial studies have not usually considered the Taiwanese case as relevant to its central concerns, aside from the fact that Taiwan appeared to have become a successful industrializing economy in the late 1970s, exactly at the time when post-colonialism and post-modernism became popular in academic studies of the Third World or, later, the South.

More similar to post-colonialism is the emphasis on the interactions between Japan and Taiwan, which has appeared in the present-day studies of colonial Taiwan: instead of comparing both countries as more or less separated entities which developed under along different paths, albeit under one another's influence, it is rather their commonalities in the modernization process which come to the fore. This is more like how post-colonialism has inspired the emergence of global history as a new historical discipline during the late 1990s. I would suggest that both books under review belong to this new genre of global history. The starting point is no longer the principled inequality and competitiveness between political units

(mainly national states) and the question of how the trajectory runs from underdevelopment towards a stage of development or even “developed”, but it is presumed that political units are principally equivalent to one another and run through a trajectory in and by interaction with one another. Equivalence in this approach of history doesn’t mean equality in any absolute sense; rather it means that the principal inequality as inheres in the conventional national historiography is left behind and rejected as “eurocentric”, and that the potential for development on its own terms by any contemporary state is better acknowledged, and looked upon primarily from the point of view of its interaction with other states. One might say, that global history is the history of the interactions between states, such as in particular the cross-border flows of people, commodities, capital and ideas, whereas the conventional history depicted the histories of individual states. The newer approach makes for efforts to transcend the binaries and dichotomies such as between “modern” and “traditional”, or “feudal” and “capitalist”, and also leaves space for analyses in terms of informal power structures as exist in everyday speech, literature and the arts, and for hybridity and ambivalence in the exercise of power and the formation of political identities. It is no surprise that in the books under review here, the creed of Michel Foucault is conspicuously present with concepts such as discourse, disciplinarity and governmentality, and also that they show attention for the exercise of power at a micro and/or individual level. Caroline Ts’ai explicitly adheres to the principles advocated since the “cultural turn” which occurred in the social sciences in the course of the 1990s and aimed at redressing the one-sided emphasis of earlier studies on the politics and economics of nation-states based on measurable, or “hard” data. Leo Ching’s monograph (2001), much quoted and discussed by Ts’ai is probably the best-known example of such an approach in a Western language.²

At the same time, historiography is conceived of as a discourse, or part of a

² Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

discourse, by itself. There is a sharp awareness of the selectivity of what is desired, or opportune, to be remembered. The various stages through which historiography on Taiwan passed during the postwar period are viewed upon as constructions which responded to different social and political needs from those which exist nowadays; and what is needed nowadays is also basically constructed rather than just findable in the surviving source materials. Both of the books under review are very much aware of the historiographies which they envisage to complement, or even replace, and of the relevance of the political issues against the background of which they are written. This background is, basically, the continuing problem of Taiwan's position vis-à-vis China in the first place, but also vis-à-vis Japan, Southeast Asia and the community of nations which it likes to be part of as a respected political entity in one way or another.

Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building – an Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering

Caroline Ts'ai's monograph is mainly on how the Japanese colonialists got Taiwan's development towards modernity organized. The hokō (Chinese: baojia) system is taken as exemplary for what happened to the construction of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy as a whole. Ts'ai's basic contention is that the Japanese through the integration of the refurbished hokō system into the colony's bureaucracy managed to extend their organizational control down to the bottom of Taiwanese society and thereby laid the foundation for Taiwan's "national" integration, after WWII to be built upon by the Kuomintang government. The war did play a very important role in this: it accelerated the assimilation process put into motion by earlier policies within their project of colonial modernization. The continuity between the Japanese occupation and the postwar period consists for one important part of the emergence of a Taiwanese identity during the former period and its survival during the latter. During the late 1940s, the suppression by the

Kuomintang of anything of a Japanese orientation among the Taiwanese and the efforts it made at the enforcement among the latter of a Chinese identity put the Japanese colonial period at a distance and ignored most of its relevance for Taiwan's development towards modernity. One important consequence of this was that it became impossible for the Taiwanese to claim compensation for damage incurred during the war: they were not acknowledged as colonial subjects any longer, and the Kuomintang government ignored the problem of war compensations. This changed when Taiwan got on more of an independent status during the 1980s and a different memory of the Japanese past became possible, and was required. The changes made it possible for the later President Lee Denghui to publicly doubt whether the Taiwanese could claim a Chinese identity and project anew the image of Japan as a benevolent "motherland", just like part of the Taiwanese native elite had done under colonialism (Liao and Wang 2006: 2, 14).

Ts'ai's book aims at contributing to the reworking of that memory. It is an admirable effort at mapping out the manner in which the Japanese built up their apparatus of administrative control and mobilization, and so achieved what she calls colonial modernity. The introduction to the book frames her intentions as follows:

Ultimately, this book is about social grafting and colonial engineering. I illuminate how Japanese colonial administration worked, or did not work...It places Taiwan within the discursive framework of Japan's colonial empire, while seeking to engage with modern China's national discourse. It is not only a book about colonial modernity, colonial governmentality, and colonial legacy – it is a discourse on Taiwan. (p. 11)

Ts'ai makes it clear that she intends to dispose of the national and developmental historiographies treated above. More in particular she intends to contest the type of institutional historiography practiced by the voluminous Iwanami Series on *Modern Japan and the colonies*, published in 1992-3. Aside from resorting under the "hard", or quantitative approaches of history, which

according to Ts'ai should be amended by an approach which involves culture, this series in her view reinstalls Imperial Japan at the core of the Meiji restoration, and ignores "war and empire, if not responsibility" (p. 10). Her own approach is clearly in line with the global history approach sketched above; when discussing the cultural turn of the 1990s she writes:

Increasing attention is now paid to the interaction of the colonial relationship, highlighting that the relationship is shaped as much by the colonized as by the colonizers. Life is affected as much in the core as it is in the periphery, and thus the study of the Japanese empire is not complete without including both its formal and its informal colonies. This tendency to integrate colonial history with mainstream Japanese studies constitutes an approach to de-center Japanese history. At the core of this cultural turn is colonial modernity. (pp. 4-5)

The principal equivalence between colonizer and colonized and between core and periphery, as expressed in this quote and endorsed by Ts'ai, is typical of the global history approaches which began to emerge in the early 1990s and have served to restore the agency of the people colonized by the West and Japan from the nineteenth century onwards. Its reference to de-centering may be compared to the efforts by global historians to "provincialize Europe". Ts'ai specifically uses this as an antidote to Japanese national history and has constructed her own conceptual apparatus to that end. "Colonial engineering" is the central concept devised by her to operationalize her basic contentions. It intends to make it clear how the Japanese colonizers consciously built and grafted their administrative apparatus on and into Taiwan's native society and institutions. Her book works this out in its three parts, the chapters in which each has been given "a specific approach that best reveals the issues I aim to explore"(p. 2).

Part One ("Law, order, and colonial governance") details how the colonial administration was built in Taiwan; in doing so it provides the framework against which the themes of social engineering and wartime mobilization are explored in

the other two parts. Its three chapters explain how the colonial government made use of the lessons learned from the Meiji experience to build a bureaucracy based on natural villages. Chapter One (“Rule by law”) focuses on lawgiving. It argues that the modernization of the legal system followed Western systems of lawgiving, especially the French one, and by its extension to the bottom of society spread the notion of legal rationality in modern lawgiving among all layers of the population.

Chapter Two (“The Emperor’s servants”) looks at the personnel composition of the colonial bureaucracy. The main distinction here is between the formal bureaucracy and what Ts’ai calls the extra-bureaucracy. The formal bureaucracy was dominated by Japanese officials and left little space for mobility of Taiwanese aspirants. Contrary to the existing literature however Ts’ai argues that the channels for upward mobility were not principally closed to the native Taiwanese, especially so the examination system, however much it may have been manipulated by the Japanese colonials to serve their own purposes. This is important because it makes it more plausible that also the “extra-bureaucracy” worked properly and constituted a smooth interface between the formal bureaucracy and the population, despite the fact that this was the sphere in which the Taiwanese were made part of the institutional fabric constructed by the Japanese.

Chapter Three (The “police as lord”) takes on the literature which features colonial Taiwan as a police state in which the police bossed everything over and was used as an instrument to force the Japanese modernization project through. Especially Yao Jen-to is attacked because, according to Ts’ai, Yao one-sidedly pictures the hokō system as a control mechanism, ignoring, just like earlier studies, that the hokō system took part in a traditional society, which operated in the context of a moral society. Ts’ai to the contrary suggests, that the police system, just like the rest of the colonial administration was built up in a more organic manner, taking into account how the local population and elites reacted to its installation.

In Part Two (“Colonial engineering”) Ts’ai sets this machinery of institutions and their personnel in motion. The three chapters in it respectively treat her focal

themes, first of “colonial engineering”, which involves “colonial governmentality”, secondly “social engineering” and thirdly “creating the local”. Chapter Four (“Colonial governmentality”) practically begins by remarking that Ts’ai finds “Foucault’s theorization of discourse hard to pin down” (p. 94), which she feels leaves her space to interpret his theorizing after her own insights. In this respect it seems that she adjoins other Taiwanese historians, including Yao Jen-to mentioned above, and Lu Shao-li, who interpret governmentality as the extension of government both to virtually all aspects of life, and to the most fundamental levels of society, explicitly involving individuals. The government’s reform efforts according to Ts’ai, whether successful or not, “reflected a conscious effort on the part of the colonial administration to transform Taiwanese economy, customs and society.” (p. 113) Little attention is paid to the language used by the colonial government, but it seems clear that enlightenment thinking played a predominant role in it.

These themes are further elaborated in chapters Five (“Social engineering”) and Six (“Creating the local”). Chapter Five relates how the construction of a modern state apparatus was engineered by grafting it on the Taiwanese native society, or local societies. Naturally, elaborate attention is paid to the interactions between the formal state apparatus and the “extra-bureaucracy” in transmitting specific programs to the population at large.

Chapter Six (“Creating the local”) then sets out to argue, that what is called “the local” was the result of an interactive process, which combined the “fully integrated state mechanism” with “local sources (historical roots, social needs, and the romanticization of natural settlements), which offered a vital means for organization.” (p. 146) This resulted according to Ts’ai in the formation of a distinct Taiwanese identity and also created the conditions under which the Taiwanese population could be effectively mobilized during the 1930s and 1940s.

From this it is a short step to the “mobilization for total war” which happened after Japan’s invasion of China after 1937. This is the subject of Part Three (“War,

mobilization, and legacy”). In many ways this part provides the focal argument of the book: Ts’ai envisages to bring (total) war back into history and remember it not as an episode to be forgotten because it brought the preceding exploitation and oppression of the Taiwanese to its high point, but to the contrary as the episode, which sublimated all that had been achieved in colonial state building in the previous decades, and laid the groundwork for the subsequent state formation by the Kuomintang regime. Chapter Seven (The “Emperor’s subjects”) argues that a measure of equality was allowed the Taiwanese during the war years, which converted “colonial governmentality into subjectivity”, meaning that they identified as the “Emperor’s subjects” to a certain degree, namely “in terms of obligations and death” (p. 187). Chapter Eight (“Bringing war back into history”) details how this was engineered through the assimilation (*dōka*) and integration (*ichigenka*) discourses and the related mobilization practices. Important here is, that Taiwan was pictured during these years as “Japan’s alternative modernity”, meaning that Taiwan was principally equal to Japan in its capacity at modernization, and only suffered from a time lag. Chapter Nine (“Politics of memory and history”) finally evaluates the implications of Ts’ai’s vision of the (total) war for the development of a Taiwanese identity. The compensation movement of the mid 1970s to the early 1990s is the clearest proof of the possibility for Taiwanese during the war period to have identified with the Japanese colonial state as part of the Japanese Empire, a possibility denied them by the subsequent Kuomintang rule. This denial obstructed the recognition of the existence of a Taiwanese identity.

A review such as this one can never do right to a text such as Caroline Ts’ai’s. It is very rich in descriptive detail as well as in the complexity and subtlety of its arguments. Yet one comment seems in place: maybe the argument could have been contextualized better in its theorization. It is the Foucauldian framework in particular, which the present reviewer found remarkably difficult to digest, and in his view made the text less accessible to him than necessary.

In the first place, Foucauldian theorizing, in the view of this reviewer,

emerged in the 1970s basically as a critique of notions of freedom and equality as espoused by Western liberal democracy. Especially the existence of an autonomous public sphere in which it is rightful to judge the actions of states is put to the doubt. The apparent and confessed autonomy of the individual in Western societies appears to be false: the individual is entrapped as it were in a system of meanings, norms and values from which it can only escape with great difficulty. One wonders whether the term *shutaisei* 主體性 which is translated by Ts'ai as subjectivity, isn't better rendered by its more common translation as "autonomous". Ts'ai in her text often contrasts Foucault with Marxist theorizing: this is correct in the sense that Marxism just like Foucault attacks the enlightenment notion of liberty as false. Other than the Marxist political economy though, Foucault positioned the exercise of power in the much more hidden and subtle social relationships expressed and lived by everyday discourses, routine practices, lawgiving, regulations, administrative practice, the arts and literature. People are not so much caught in the relations of production in which they happen to find themselves, as the Marxists say, but in the discourses in which they take part, willingly or not. The knowledge, which inspires these discourses empowers those who acquire it in a much less visible way than in the case when formal positions of power are attained and thus creates the knowledge/power nexus which takes central stage in Foucault's work. These discourses, which Foucault discerns as determinative of modern Western society date back to the eighteenth century Enlightenment, or even earlier, to the sixteenth century Renaissance. Governmentality and disciplinarity in this perspective have not been consciously and programmatically imposed on the modernizing Western societies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but emerged gradually, enabling the internalization of the concomitant discourses of modernity. In Ts'ai's theorizing, however, and apparently she is not alone in this, Foucauldian governance is not a means to attack the enlightenment notion of liberty, but a set of policy aims directed at the achievement of modernity. One might say that the anti-establishment connotations of Foucault's social philosophy are being turned into a positive

program for social reform. Not so surprising then, as she confesses, that Ts'ai isn't quite able to operationalize Foucault's theorizing, as we saw above, and at times tries to amend her theoretical apparatus by other, and very different sociological theories (pp. 118, 188).

Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945; History, Culture, Memory

Liao and Wang's edited volume complements Ts'ai's monograph in several important ways, even though its publication preceded Ts'ai's by three years (2006). This is because it focuses on the interface between the Japanese colonialists and the native Taiwanese population in as far as this consisted of its educated elite. Here we have the world of journalists, students, ethnographers, writers and painters, which went creatively about the pressures of colonialism and gave expression to what allegedly resulted, namely a distinctly Taiwanese identity. In Liao and Wang's words, the double pressure of both Japanese and Chinese modernity created an identity, which was neither Japanese nor Chinese. Especially the young Taiwanese who went to study in Japan and had only known colonial society "bricolated" transnational codes and forces into new shapes, without getting a bad consciousness it seems. (Introduction, p.5) But also the Japanese colonizers are involved and introduced here in the shape of individuals or small collectivities while interacting with Taiwanese society.

One may perceive a similar program, or paradigm to Ts'ai's in the construction of this book. Ts'ai starts from the process of two-sided and equivalent organizational and administrative integration between Japan and Taiwan, which emphasizes the interactions between both instead of picturing them as separate spatial entities moving each along a different time axis, as is usual in the conventional "national" historiography. Aside from being a product of the "cultural

turn” in the social sciences even more immediately than Ts'ai's work, the simultaneity and interactivity of social change, which may even be extended to a global scale, replaces the teleology, which adheres to the historiography of the modern national state. One may call Liao and Wang's approach post-modern also in the sense that the big narrative of “progress and history” (Ts'ai 2009: 118) is replaced by individual stories and micro-histories which all together count up to a representation of reality which is much more diffuse and subjective than the positivism of modernization theory. But also they intentionally shun terms such as hybridity and ambivalence, which are so fundamental to cultural studies, and also to Ts'ai's work. This is how Liao and Wang frame their program for their book:

Rather than highlighting “hybridity”, “catachresis”, “conviviality,” etc. with the focus on colonial acts of cultural appropriation on the part of postcolonial subjects, we may be better off looking at the ways in which individuals, as moral and political agents, are affected by their experiences traveling across national borders, and constituted by and constitutive of the cultural institution of a specific historical moment. The dynamics of travel and cultural translation is not necessarily played out in the form of an ambivalent chronotopical lag between metropole and colony, of tensions between the often polarized discursive positions of dwelling and traveling.... (Introduction p. 6).

In view of her congeniality with the editors' program it is small wonder that Caroline Ts'ai contributed a chapter to the volume. It is basically a summary of her book, but since it is less overlaid with theorizing one may quite take it as an introduction to it. The first chapter after the Introduction, by Wakabayashi Masahiro, on the postwar Japanese historiography of Taiwan during the Japanese occupation may be taken as an example of how the editors wish to reframe Taiwanese historiography, turning it from being national to being postcolonial, and making it thus contribute to postcolonial historiography. Also Yao Jen-to, so much contested by Ts'ai contributed a chapter, which is also taken to contribute in this

way. The quote by Michel Foucault at the head of the chapter however enlightens us on the interpretations which both Yao and Ts'ai use of Foucault to explain Japanese colonialism: "The fact that societies can become the object of scientific observation, that human behavior became, from a certain point on, a problem to be analysed and resolved, all that is bound up, I believe, with mechanisms of power". (p. 36) Yao just as Ts'ai by selecting the consequences of the scientific acquisition of knowledge from Foucault's work, connecting it with the exercise of power in a colonial society and assigning a positive meaning to it makes it difficult for him to follow Foucault's theorizing in its authentic shape. Yet his story is worth it to be told. The Japanese were obsessed with gaining sufficient knowledge on the island to be able govern it. In the process they came to know it "as the palm of their hand" and were much better able than the Qing government to optimize the profit they drew from it. In this sense Yao allows of no ambivalence in the construction of Japan's colonial governmentality and rejects the study of literature and the arts as a legitimate way to know Japanese governance better. It is striking though how he frames the functions of this knowledge, when discussing the land survey: "...to suggest that the sole purpose of levying more land taxes was the colonial state's revenue is to misunderstand the essence of the land survey and, more generally, the whole project of colonial enumeration and classification.... it was a method of overcoming and controlling potential threats to the colonial government...." (p. 51). There is a suggestion here, that the Japanese really achieved the control, which they desired. It is impossible to know however how much leeway the whole operation of knowledge collection left for dodging and manipulation by the native Taiwanese, despite its apparent success. Yao makes it very clear that the survey was imposed with great force on the population, which makes it difficult to believe that it cooperated willingly with the surveyors. But also it is not acknowledged, that colonial populations usually adapted to the categories of the colonizers, as has been shown for example for colonial India (with which Yao compares Taiwan), creating a dialectic between colonizers and colonized, which escapes positivist interpretations such as Yao's of knowledge acquisition and of the knowledge/power

nexus.

More immediately relevant to the program of the book are the trajectories, such as those run by the painter Ishikawa Kinichirō between Japan and Taiwan. Yen Chuan-ying contributes a chapter on Ishikawa to the book, and Liao and Wang use his case to portray their purposes with it in their introduction. Basically we see here how the Japanese colonials manipulated cultural production in order to impose their rule. Liao and Wang view upon this as potentially beneficial, yet they cannot prevent themselves from being somewhat sanguine about it either: “Under the edict of integration and equality designed to make the colonized useful subjects to the Japanese emperor, the arts and humanities were increasingly emphasized (after 1920 LD) as a means to tame the Taiwanese.” (Introduction, p. 8) Ishikawa lived and worked in Taiwan as a teacher before as well as after 1920 and thus represents two modes of cultural imposition on the Taiwanese, one top-down, the other more empathic, and thereby more popular and lasting. Also he traveled between both parts of the empire and thereby connected them among one another. Another example of such traveling is the Tale of the “Bell of Sayon”, a story about wartime aboriginal heroism, which was performed in a number of different guises and shuttled up and down between Japan and Taiwan. It served as one means to raise war consciousness deeply into Taiwan, and thus the study of it seems necessary for an understanding of Japanese governmentality, contrary to what Yao Jen-to suggests to us.

The rest of the volume offers a rich collection of case studies, which elaborate the basic themes launched by the editors. Liao himself and Fujii Shōzō use the framework offered by Benedict Anderson to show how national integration was furthered by the official policies to introduce periodicals and magazines, and by the spread of Japanese respectively. Both enabled the formation of “imagined communities”, which begun to encompass the island as a whole. Liao suggests that an oppositional movement could have resulted from this, but leaves us somewhat at a loss on whether this happened or not, and why (not). It is remarkable in view of

the conscious cultural imperialism enacted by the Japanese, that the easy survival of classical Chinese as a lively means of expression is attested to in Huang Mei-er's chapter, and maybe even more remarkable in view of much that has been said in the above, that the sinification of Taiwan's culture did not originate with the Kuomintang in the 1950s, but according to Huang Ying-che pre-dated the war. Also we can read how according to several authors big cleavages remained between the colonials and the colonized. Fong Shiaw-chian argues, that Japanese hegemony could only be weak as long as modernity and Japanization remained limited to the Taiwanese elite, and the large majority of the population kept to its Chinese ways. Faye Yuan Kleeman's contribution may be mentioned as a corollary to this observation, in the sense that her object of study, the work of Nishikawa Misuru apparently eroticized the women in the Taiwanese colony, and thereby alienated them from the possibility to become recognized as full citizen's of the Japanese Empire. Wu Micha brings in the question of Japanese racism in his study of wartime ethnography, something that is conspicuously absent, at least in a direct and explicit manner of treatment from both books under review. Peng Hsiao-yen nicely treats the realism in the literary works by the contemporaries Yang Kui and Liu Na'ou, contrasting Liu's down-to-earth socialism with Yang's cosmopolitan but also positively sexist dandyism. Here another boundary is transgressed by involving the expatriate Taiwanese community in Shanghai.

Just as in the case of Caroline Ts'ai's book it is impossible in a review to do right to all that is written in this very attractive volume. Even not all its essays could be discussed. Nonetheless it is hoped that this review stimulates readers to make a thorough acquaintance with its contents and take these as a point of reference for their orientation on the study of Taiwan's colonial history, and also involve it in and integrate it with mainstream historical studies. This may be the field of postcolonial studies, as the editors explicitly envisage, but also of global history. Both Ts'ai's monograph and the volume by Liao and Wang could help to break through the near-monopoly which Anglo-American academia unfortunately

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has on this important new discipline. The so-called Non-Western world shows a lukewarm interest in this field thus far, and Taiwanese studies in the view of this reviewer could help bridge the gap.

One last critical remark: the editing of the texts could have been done better. It is another unfortunate development that publishers, even renowned ones nowadays rarely bother to properly edit their publications and come close to being printing houses and sales companies if academic work is concerned. But if a broader audience is to be reached for volumes as reviewed here, and of which has hopefully been shown that they deserve to be read by a global audience, they could better be taken care of in appropriate manner also in this respect.

